The ‘Crypto-Agile’ Audit: Preparing for Quantum Threats Summary: If you run blockchain, PKI, or payments infrastructure, you are now on the clock to make signatures, key exchange, and smart wallets crypto‑agile. NIST PQC is finalized (ML‑KEM, ML‑DSA, SLH‑DSA), hybrid TLS is moving through IETF, ML‑DSA is an RFC for X.509, and major HSMs and L2s have shipped enabling features—so your 2026 plan should replace “wait and see” with staged cutovers tied to procurement.

Who this is for (and the keywords you care about)

• Audience: CIOs/CISOs, Heads of Cryptography/PKI, Digital Asset Custody Leads, Blockchain Platform Owners in banks, exchanges, payment processors, and tokenization programs.
• Your required keywords (we’ll use them precisely throughout):
  • CNSA 2.0, CNSSP‑15 milestones; FIPS 203/204/205; RFC 9881 (ML‑DSA in X.509); TLS 1.3 ECDHE‑MLKEM hybrid; EntryPoint v0.8, EIP‑7702; ERC‑1271, ERC‑6492; PKCS#11; FIPS 140‑3 Level 3 HSM (Luna, Utimaco); ML‑KEM/ML‑DSA support in HSM firmware; stateful HBS (LMS/XMSS) under SP 800‑208; WebAuthn/P‑256 via RIP/EIP‑7212; zkVM/SP1; STARK “post‑quantum‑friendly.”

Hook — The specific technical headache you’re hiding from

• Your PKI team can issue ML‑DSA certs tomorrow, but your custody HSM cluster can’t sign or verify them consistently across partitions; your blockchain stack still assumes ECDSA/keccak; your mobile wallet roadmap promises passkeys (P‑256) this quarter; meanwhile procurement wants “CNSA 2.0 compliant” language in RFPs and the TLS team is piloting X25519+ML‑KEM without breaking mTLS. RFC 9881 (ML‑DSA in X.509) is live, TLS hybrid key exchange drafts define X25519MLKEM768, and Cloudflare/AWS already run PQ‑TLS in production paths—so the bottleneck is no longer standards, it’s your integration plan, HSM firmware, and smart‑account design. (datatracker.ietf.org)

Agitate — The risk of slipping 2026–2031 milestones is real money

• Regulatory/mission timelines:
  • CNSA 2.0/NSM‑10: no enforcement before Dec 31, 2025, but all new NSS acquisitions must be CNSA 2.0 by Jan 1, 2027; phase‑outs by 2030; full enforcement by Dec 31, 2031; quantum‑resistant by 2035. If you onboard long‑lived systems in 2026 without crypto‑agility, you buy tomorrow’s tech debt at today’s prices. (safelogic.com)
  • UK NCSC says identify vulnerable services by 2028, prioritize upgrades by 2031, finish by 2035—so 2026–2028 is your window to inventory and pilot. (theguardian.com)
• Threat timing:
  • There’s no CRQC today, but “harvest‑now‑decrypt‑later” means 2026 secrets can be exposed in the 2030s. NIST has finalized ML‑KEM, ML‑DSA, SLH‑DSA and urges migration to start now. (csrc.nist.gov)
• Engineering reality:
  • Your stacks are fragmented: TLS endpoints, gRPC between microservices, on‑chain wallets, firmware signing, and cross‑chain bridges. Each needs a tailored migration (hybrid TLS, ML‑DSA X.509, LMS/XMSS for long‑lived firmware, and ZK‑wrapped verification flows for chains). Delay here = release slippage, emergency waivers, and higher audit cost in 2027–2030.

Solve — 7Block Labs’ “Crypto‑Agile” Audit and Migration Methodology We design for two truths: 1) signatures and KEMs will change again; 2) your ROI depends on not pausing product roadmaps. Our methodology is built to meet CNSA 2.0 and enterprise blockchain constraints without crypto‑bro theatrics.

1. Standards‑anchored target architecture (no guesswork)

• Control‑plane cryptography:
  • Signatures: adopt ML‑DSA for X.509 chains now (per RFC 9881), reserve SLH‑DSA (SPHINCS+) for backup use cases and artifacts with very long validity; plan for FN‑DSA when FIPS 206 finalizes. (datatracker.ietf.org)
  • Key establishment: pilot TLS 1.3 hybrid groups X25519MLKEM768 / P‑256MLKEM768 using the IETF drafts; align with Cloudflare/AWS PQ‑TLS deployment blueprints. (ietf.org)
  • Stateful HBS: where you sign firmware or quorum configs, we implement LMS/XMSS under SP 800‑208 with strict state‑management, ideally in HSM. (csrc.nist.gov)
• Ethereum account model crypto‑agility:
  • Use EIP‑7702 (mainnet May 7, 2025) to “attach” smart‑account logic to EOAs so you can evolve validation policies without changing user addresses. Pair with ERC‑1271 for contract‑based signature validation, and ERC‑6492 for pre‑deploy signature checks in onboarding flows. (blog.ethereum.org)
  • Short‑term UX: enable passkeys (WebAuthn P‑256) via rollup precompiles (RIP/EIP‑7212) that many L2s shipped in 2024–2025, then roadmap post‑quantum verification via ZK (see below). (gov.optimism.io)
• ZK as the post‑quantum bridge:
  • SNARKs are not post‑quantum, STARKs are hash‑based and considered post‑quantum‑friendly; we use zkVMs and STARK‑style systems to verify PQ signatures off‑chain and post succinct proofs on‑chain. Succinct’s SP1 and similar stacks make this operational today. (arxiv.org)

1. HSM/KMS enablement without forklift upgrades

• Thales Luna firmware 7.9 (and T‑Series 7.15.0) support ML‑KEM/ML‑DSA mechanisms with PKCS#11 extensions; Utimaco Quantum Protect adds ML‑KEM/ML‑DSA plus LMS/XMSS with a simulator for integration testing. We standardize on vendor‑defined mechanisms now and map to FIPS OIDs as they settle. (thalesdocs.com)
• We build PQ‑TLS pilots through AWS Payment Cryptography/AWS SDKs and test end‑to‑end with CloudTrail tlsDetails to confirm ML‑KEM was used. (aws.amazon.com)

1. Solidity and wallet migrations you can ship in sprints

• Validation policy module:
  • Implement a validator module (ERC‑1271) that accepts: secp256k1 (ECDSA), P‑256 (via RIP/EIP‑7212 where available), and ZK‑wrapped ML‑DSA/SLH‑DSA (off‑chain verify → on‑chain proof). This isolates signature agility from your core business logic. (ercs.ethereum.org)
• 7702‑based “smart EOA” rollout:
  • Keep the same user addresses while layering sponsor‑gas, batched ops, session keys, and policy upgrades. EntryPoint v0.8 & emerging ERC‑7579/7902 capability descriptors are compatible with this approach. (hackmd.io)

1. Procurement‑ready artifacts (what your RFP and CAB need)

• RFP clauses we deliver:
  • “TLS endpoints SHALL support TLS 1.3 hybrid groups X25519MLKEM768 and P‑256MLKEM768 as specified in draft‑ietf‑tls‑ecdhe‑mlkem; certificate chains SHALL use ML‑DSA per RFC 9881; firmware signing SHALL use LMS/HSS under SP 800‑208 in FIPS 140‑3 Level 3 HSMs; vendor SHALL document PKCS#11 mechanism IDs for ML‑KEM/ML‑DSA and provide migration runbooks.”
• CAB/Architecture board packages:
  • Threat model for HNDL (harvest‑now‑decrypt‑later); key ceremonies for LMS state management; rollback plans; performance envelopes for PQ‑TLS; gas and latency baselines for ZK‑wrapped verification.

1. Delivery structure and SLAs

• Phase 0 (2–3 weeks): Crypto inventory across PKI, TLS, HSMs, Solidity repos, wallets, bridges. We tag every endpoint/contract with “algorithm, lib, OID/mech, upgrade path.”
• Phase 1 (6–8 weeks): PQ‑TLS pilot + ML‑DSA issuing CA; 7702/1271 policy module for one production dapp; HSM firmware upgrades piloted in non‑prod.
• Phase 2 (8–12 weeks): Rollout to priority services; ZK‑wrapped ML‑DSA validation path to an L2; firm RFP language and vendor conformance tests.

Practical examples (precise, 2026‑ready patterns)

1. Custody platform: firmware signing + wallets

• Problem: ECDSA‑signed firmware, seed‑phrase wallets, and EOAs tied to a static signature scheme.
• Implementation:
  • Firmware: shift to LMS/HSS (SP 800‑208) in HSM with state replication; roadmap ML‑DSA‑87 in 2027. (csrc.nist.gov)
  • Wallets: enable passkeys via RIP/EIP‑7212 on supported L2s now; deploy 7702 so customers keep their EOA while gaining smart‑account features and later signature upgrades. (gov.optimism.io)
  • PKI: issue ML‑DSA intermediate CAs; dual‑stack verification in apps; no hybrid certs until LAMPS finalizes composites. (datatracker.ietf.org)
• Outcome: immediate UX win + a “no address change” posture; firmware cutovers without downtime; auditors map controls to CNSA 2.0.

1. Tokenized assets / DvP rails between L2s

• Problem: Bridging and settlement code assumes ECDSA and on‑chain verification of classical signatures.
• Implementation:
  • Off‑chain verification of ML‑DSA/SLH‑DSA with zkVM (SP1/RISC‑Zero class), on‑chain STARK verification; proof aggregation to keep gas bounded. (blog.succinct.xyz)
  • Bridge control plane uses PQ‑TLS and ML‑KEM authenticated channels. (ietf.org)
• Outcome: bridge stays secure against HNDL; verification costs predictable even as signature schemes rotate.

1. Exchange: API/mTLS and CA rotation

• Problem: You need PQ‑TLS for customer API traffic and inter‑service calls; your CA must issue ML‑DSA leafs without breaking clients.
• Implementation:
  • Pilot X25519MLKEM768 in canary tier; ML‑DSA X.509 per RFC 9881; verify with Cloudflare/AWS‑style telemetry. (ietf.org)
  • HSM: Thales 7.9/T‑Series 7.15 or Utimaco Quantum Protect firmware enable PKCS#11 mechanisms for ML‑KEM/ML‑DSA; simulator‑first testing. (thalesdocs.com)
• Outcome: staged rollout with mTLS continuity; procurement can mandate CNSA 2.0‑capable endpoints in vendor contracts. (safelogic.com)

Best emerging practices we recommend in 2026

• Prefer “pure” ML‑DSA certificates per RFC 9881; hold off on hybrid/composite certificates until LAMPS completes the composite ML‑DSA track (it advanced through multiple drafts in late 2025). (datatracker.ietf.org)
• Use TLS hybrids (ECDHE+ML‑KEM) for forward secrecy without client lockouts; track the ECDHE‑MLKEM draft as it moves toward RFC. (ietf.org)
• For very long‑lived signatures (firmware, root‑of‑trust), deploy LMS/XMSS via SP 800‑208 with strong state‑control; schedule migration to ML‑DSA by 2030 to meet CNSA 2.0 priorities. (csrc.nist.gov)
• On Ethereum:
  • Ship 7702 now to avoid “address migration” debt; wrap signature verification behind ERC‑1271; use ERC‑6492 for pre‑deploy flows. (ethereum.org)
  • Where you need passkeys, target L2s with RIP/EIP‑7212 precompiles today; when mainnet standardizes P‑256 precompile, you can unify paths. (gov.optimism.io)
• For ZK:
  • Favor STARK‑style systems when you want “post‑quantum‑friendly” properties; use SP1/zkVM ecosystems that already power rollups and can verify arbitrary Rust/C code for PQC. (arxiv.org)

The proof — credible signals you can deploy, not hype

• NIST PQC is real and final: FIPS 203 (ML‑KEM), 204 (ML‑DSA), 205 (SLH‑DSA) approved Aug 13, 2024; FALCON (FIPS 206) is tracking later. (csrc.nist.gov)
• X.509 with ML‑DSA is standardized: RFC 9881 (Oct 2025). (datatracker.ietf.org)
• Hybrid TLS is converging: IETF drafts define ECDHE‑MLKEM groups and hybrid construction; IESG last calls progressed in 2025. (ietf.org)
• Zero Trust stacks with PQ‑TLS exist: Cloudflare’s Zero Trust and AWS Payment Cryptography ship end‑to‑end PQ options. (cloudflare.com)
• HSMs are catching up: Thales Luna 7.9+/T‑Series 7.15 ship ML‑KEM/ML‑DSA; Utimaco Quantum Protect adds ML‑KEM/ML‑DSA + LMS/XMSS with a simulator. (thalesdocs.com)
• Ethereum account abstraction is here: Pectra (May 7, 2025) landed EIP‑7702; ERC‑1271/6492 adopted across stacks; multiple L2s run P‑256 precompiles. (blog.ethereum.org)

What you get with 7Block Labs (and where to start)

• Crypto‑Agile Audit deliverables:
  • A prioritized inventory mapped to CNSA 2.0 and your product deadlines.
  • A standards‑aligned reference design (TLS stacks, PKI, HSM, Solidity wallet policy).
  • A sprint plan with measurable KPIs tied to releases and procurement.
• We implement, not just advise:
  • PQ‑TLS pilots and ML‑DSA issuing CAs; HSM firmware upgrades with vendor simulators; ERC‑1271 modules + 7702 wallets; ZK‑wrapped verification for PQ signatures.
• Scalable engagement:
  • Start with a focused line of business (e.g., tokenization or custody ops) and a target chain (L2 with RIP‑7212). Expand to the core platform once success metrics are met.

KPIs and GTM metrics we commit to measure

• Cryptography change‑lead time: days from policy change to production cutover (goal: <30 days per service after Phase 1).
• PQ‑TLS adoption: % of inbound API traffic negotiated with ML‑KEM hybrids (goal: >50% on pilot surfaces within 60 days). (ietf.org)
• Wallet UX uplift: passkey journeys completion rate vs seed‑phrase baseline on supported L2s (target +10–20%).
• On‑chain verification cost: gas to validate ZK proofs for PQ signatures vs legacy schemes on target L2s (target: ≤ existing SNARK/STARK proof‑verify costs).
• Audit readiness: # of control gaps closed against CNSA 2.0 inventory and NCSC timeline (target: close P0 gaps within 90 days). (safelogic.com)

How we connect to outcomes (ROI, procurement, delivery)

• ROI lens:
  • Reduced future refactors by separating “signature policy” from business logic (7702+1271).
  • Lower vendor risk: HSM simulator‑first integration, then firmware rollout.
  • Avoid last‑minute waivers by anchoring to NIST/IETF artifacts already accepted by auditors (FIPS 203/204/205; RFC 9881; TLS hybrid drafts).
• Procurement‑ready:
  • We hand your sourcing team copy‑pasteable clauses and measurable acceptance tests (OIDs, PKCS#11 mechanisms, TLS ciphers, ZK proof verification gas caps).
• Delivery:
  • We operate as an extension of your cryptography and platform teams with clear sprint cadences.

Where to go next with 7Block Labs

• If you need implementation muscle, see our:
  • custom blockchain integration and backend adapters under our blockchain integration practice,
  • end‑to‑end audits via our security audit services,
  • full‑stack builds in our web3 development services and blockchain development services,
  • ZK and cross‑chain engineering via cross‑chain solutions development and blockchain bridge development,
  • smart wallet and policy modules via smart contract development and dapp development.
• If you’re building tokenized markets or custody rails, we also cover asset tokenization, asset management platform development, and DeFi development services.

Brief in‑depth technical notes (for your crypto/PKI leads)

• ML‑DSA for X.509: RFC 9881 defines OIDs and encoding for ML‑DSA‑44/65/87; use “pure” (not pre‑hash) as per RFC guidance unless policy requires pre‑hash flows; plan revocation path equivalence tests. (datatracker.ietf.org)
• TLS hybrids: the IETF hybrid‑design draft decouples mechanism negotiation; the ecdhe‑mlkem draft standardizes concrete X25519MLKEM768 / P‑256MLKEM768 groups, which are already deployable without waiting for an RFC, per Cloudflare’s field notes. (datatracker.ietf.org)
• HSM mechanics: Thales Luna 7.9 introduces CKM_ML_KEM/CKM_ML_DSA families; T‑Series 7.15.0 ships standardized PQC; Utimaco exposes PQC via vendor‑defined PKCS#11; use their simulators to validate CSR issuance, backup/restore, and HA replication semantics before rotating live CAs. (thalesdocs.com)
• Ethereum stack:
  • 7702 on mainnet since May 7, 2025 (Pectra); EntryPoint v0.8 is current across AA tooling; combine with ERC‑1271/6492 for signature agility and pre‑deploy flows; L2s widely support P‑256 precompiles for WebAuthn. (blog.ethereum.org)
• ZK posture: when you need post‑quantum‑friendly assurances, bias to STARKs or prove PQ verification in a zkVM and verify succinctly on‑chain; production stacks like SP1 already serve rollups and bridges. (arxiv.org)

A final word on timing

• The path is clear: NIST FIPS 203/204/205 are approved; ML‑DSA in X.509 is an RFC; TLS hybrids are in late‑stage drafts with real‑world deployments; HSM vendors ship firmware; Ethereum Pectra landed 7702 for account‑level agility. Your 2026 objective is not “research PQC”—it’s “operationalize crypto‑agility without derailing releases.” (csrc.nist.gov)

Highly specific CTA If you own the PKI/HSM budget and the Ethereum roadmap: send us (1) your root/intermediate OIDs and HSM firmware versions, (2) the list of TLS endpoints to pilot X25519MLKEM768, and (3) your AA stack choice (7702/4337 vendor). We’ll return a 5‑day gap analysis with a sprint plan, draft RFP clauses, and a 12‑week rollout schedule that your CAB can approve on first review—then we’ll implement it with you.