Summary: Keyless wallets are now practical for regulated enterprises by combining passkeys (hardware-backed keys in Secure Enclave/StrongBox) with MPC and smart-account standards (EIP-7702, ERC-7710/7715). Below is a pragmatic build path with current attestation rules, protocol choices, and GTM metrics to ship in 2026.

Building “Keyless” Wallets Using Secure Enclaves and MPC

Hook — Your specific headache: You’ve committed to “seedless/keyless” onboarding this quarter, but three blockers won’t budge:

• Platform keys don’t match chain curves: iOS/Android passkeys are P‑256, while your L1 still expects secp256k1. The last time you tried a bridge library, legal flagged “no attestation chain,” and your test users hit an “unsupported algorithm” error. (eip.info)
• Android’s Remote Key Provisioning (RKP) root rotation is mid-flight. From February through April 10, 2026, RKP devices move to a new Android Attestation root; your existing trust store will start failing attestation verification on modern devices. Miss this and your fraud gates break in production. (developer.android.com)
• Your security team will not sign off on pure-software MPC after the GG18/GG20 disclosures; they want FIPS 140‑3 HSM boundaries and enclave attestation in the architecture—not a slide. (fireblocks.com)

Agitate — The risk you can’t ignore:

• Missed dates: Ethereum’s 2025 Pectra mainnet upgrade (EIP‑7702) changed wallet UX expectations—users can delegate smart behavior from EOAs without switching addresses. If you don’t support 7702‑style smart features, your funnel will leak to competitors that do. (blog.ethereum.org)
• Broken auth post‑rotation: If your Android verifier doesn’t trust the new attestation root in time, device‑bound keys will be rejected (especially RKP‑only Android 16+ devices). That’s real support volume, delayed KYC, and blocked withdrawals. (developer.android.com)
• NIST/FIPS procurement blockers: Your RFPs increasingly require “FIPS 140‑3 Level 3 HSM” and verifiable enclave attestation for any key material, including MPC shares. If you can’t map shares to HSM or enclave provenance, vendor risk teams will park your deal. (docs.aws.amazon.com)

Solve — 7Block Labs methodology (technical, but pragmatic) We implement keyless wallets by fusing device attestation, MPC threshold signing, and smart-account permissions. The outcome: no seed phrases, verifiable device identity, and programmable recovery that procurement can approve.

1. Requirements and compliance framing (1–2 weeks)

• Chains and signature schemes:
  • Ethereum/rollups: keep secp256k1, add P‑256 verification (RIP‑7212/EIP‑7951) on L2s and—where available—L1 for passkey flows. (gov.optimism.io)
  • Bitcoin/Taproot: Schnorr/BIP‑340, ideal for FROST threshold signatures. (datatracker.ietf.org)
  • Solana/TON: Ed25519; modern WebAuthn deployments increasingly surface EdDSA—plan for Ed25519 when feasible and fall back to session-keys + on-chain verifiers where not. (lists.w3.org)
• Regulatory anchors:
  • HSM boundary (FIPS 140‑3 L3) for custody/recovery shares via managed HSMs (AWS, Azure). (docs.aws.amazon.com)
  • Enclave attestation for MPC online nodes (AWS Nitro Enclaves + KMS attest policies). (docs.aws.amazon.com)

1. Device trust and “passkey-first” login (2–4 weeks)

• iOS/macOS: Use Managed Device Attestation (MDA) to bind a hardware‑generated keypair to Secure Enclave and obtain an Apple‑signed attestation certificate chain. We verify it server‑side and bind the wallet profile to that device class. (support.apple.com)
• Android: Verify Key Attestation with KeyMint/StrongBox. Update trust stores now for Google’s 2026 root rotation; RKP devices will exclusively use the new ECDSA P‑384 root by April 10, 2026. Build dual‑root trust and CRL checks. (developer.android.com)
• Passkey UX: Implement WebAuthn Client Capabilities and Conditional Create so browsers can auto‑create passkeys after password login (migration path) and expose capabilities for fallbacks. This reduces prompts and increases enrollments. (developer.chrome.com)

1. Curve mismatch resolution (the practical way)

• On rollups (and L2 stacks already shipping P‑256 precompiles), verify passkey P‑256 signatures on-chain via RIP‑7212/EIP‑7951. This lets a hardware‑backed passkey directly authorize wallet actions. (gov.optimism.io)
• On Ethereum L1, leverage EIP‑7702 smart‑account delegation to keep the EOA address while routing execution through a contract that accepts the passkey’s algorithm, or use ERC‑4337 accounts that validate P‑256 via an on-chain verifier module. (blog.ethereum.org)
• For chains that can’t ingest passkey curves, bind passkeys to time‑boxed “session keys.” Users prove possession via WebAuthn; the dapp receives an ERC‑7715 permission grant and spends it within explicit scopes (amounts, targets, expiry) through an ERC‑7710 DelegationManager. (eips.ethereum.org)

1. Threshold signing where it matters

• Prefer modern, robust ECDSA TSS (e.g., CGGMP21/24 variants) over legacy GG18/GG20 (with known Paillier pitfalls) for chain-native ECDSA. We deploy 2–3 online signing nodes with identifiable aborts and precomputation, plus key refresh. (docs.rs)
• For Schnorr/EdDSA ecosystems (Bitcoin Taproot, some L2s), use FROST (IRTF RFC 9591) and optionally ROAST for robust, asynchronous signing under churn or partial failures. (datatracker.ietf.org)

1. Hardware roots of trust for MPC shares

• “Share hardening”:
  • Hot path: MPC signers run inside AWS Nitro Enclaves. Signers fetch one‑time data keys from KMS only if the enclave attestation document matches policy (PCR/Image checks). This binds runtime to code identity. (docs.aws.amazon.com)
  • Cold path: Recovery share stored in a FIPS 140‑3 Level 3 HSM cluster (AWS CloudHSM or Azure Managed HSM). Rotate and quorum‑control export policies. (docs.aws.amazon.com)
• Device-side shares: On iOS, keys are non‑exportable and irrecoverable after erase due to Secure Enclave secret effacement; build multi‑passkey enrollment to avoid user lockout. (support.apple.com)

1. Smart-account UX that your PM will love

• ERC‑7715 permissions: grant “autopay up to X USDC per month” or “trade within pool Y with slippage ≤ Z% until T” without nag screens, redeemable via ERC‑7710 DelegationManager. Simulate before submit; revoke on‑chain or by policy. (eips.ethereum.org)
• Pectra/EIP‑7702: Keep the same EOA address, delegate to smart code just‑in‑time for batching, sponsored/stablecoin fees, and better recovery. early data: five‑figure weekly authorizations post‑launch indicate rapid adoption. (blog.ethereum.org)
• Counterfactual signatures: Support pre‑deploy signing (e.g., login before first tx) via ERC‑6492; guard against arbitrary‑call pitfalls observed in the wild by constraining the deploy target and simulating. (eips.ethereum.org)

1. Instrumentation, SLOs, and runbooks

• We wire simple SLIs: passkey enrollment success rate, attestation verification latency, UserOp success, EIP‑7702 delegation success, MPC share availability, and “time‑to‑first‑transaction.”
• Runbooks: when Android attestation root rotates, automatically reload trust stores; when Apple MDA OIDs change, pin and roll; when a signer aborts, switch to ROAST or identifiable‑abort paths; when precompiles differ across L2s, route to EIP‑7951‑capable networks. (developer.android.com)

Target audience and the keywords they actually need

• For Heads of Product (Fintech/Payments)
  • Keywords to include in your PRD: “EIP‑7702 batched transfers,” “RIP‑7212/EIP‑7951 P‑256 passkeys on L2,” “ERC‑7715 subscriptions,” “3DS2/SCA passkey‑first fallback,” “session keys,” “time‑to‑first‑transaction < 60s.”
• For Enterprise IAM/Security Architects
  • “Managed Device Attestation (Apple),” “Android RKP root rotation (P‑384),” “StrongBox/KeyMint attestationSecurityLevel=TrustedEnvironment/StrongBox,” “AWS Nitro Enclaves + KMS Recipient attestation,” “FIPS 140‑3 Level 3 HSM,” “SIEM‑grade attest logs.” (support.apple.com)
• For Procurement/Vendor Risk
  • “Key custody boundary evidence,” “change‑controlled root stores,” “RTO/RPO for MPC quorum,” “PCI DSS 4.0 mapping,” “ISO/IEC 27001:2022 artifact pack,” “cryptographic bill of materials (CBOM).” (docs.aws.amazon.com)

Practical examples (with 2026‑ready details)

Example A — Ethereum consumer wallet with passkeys, no seed phrase

• Goal: one‑tap sign‑in, programmable permissions, and stablecoin fees.
• Design:
  • WebAuthn passkeys on iOS/Android. Verify Apple MDA or Android Key Attestation; store attestation evidence with expiry. (support.apple.com)
  • On Base/OP‑Stack or other L2s that ship P‑256 precompiles, verify passkey signatures on‑chain (RIP‑7212/EIP‑7951), then delegate EOA to smart behavior via EIP‑7702 for batching and fee abstraction. (gov.optimism.io)
  • Use ERC‑7715 for recurring permissions (autopay, limit orders) with revocation via ERC‑7710. Simulate redemption before submit. (eips.ethereum.org)
• Why it works:
  • You ship “keyless” UX with hardware‑backed keys and attestation while meeting procurement’s auditability needs.
  • You avoid ECDSA curve mismatch pain on L2s already running the precompile; on L1 you keep UX via delegation/session permissions.

Example B — Bitcoin/Taproot treasury controls with mobile co‑signers

• Goal: executives co‑sign from phones, but with real hardware guarantees.
• Design:
  • Use FROST for 2‑of‑3 or 3‑of‑5 Schnorr signing: one share on a server enclave (AWS Nitro), one on a secure admin device (StrongBox/SE), one in a recovery HSM vault. (datatracker.ietf.org)
  • Enclave obtains MPC presign material only after KMS validates its attestation doc; phone co‑signers are hardware‑backed and attested. (docs.aws.amazon.com)
• Outcome:
  • “No single device to steal,” audited attestation for each signature round, and minimal interactive rounds thanks to FROST.

Example C — Institutional ECDSA MPC with FIPS boundary and modern protocols

• Goal: programmable treasury with vendor‑risk‑proof key lifecycle.
• Design:
  • Use CGGMP21/24‑style ECDSA with identifiable abort and key refresh; abandon GG18/GG20 in light of Paillier modulus pitfalls. (docs.rs)
  • Online signers in Nitro Enclaves, recovery shares in HSMs validated to FIPS 140‑3 L3; all share‑material movements logged with attested KMS Recipient policies. (docs.aws.amazon.com)

Best emerging practices for 2026 builds

• Update Android attestation trust stores now. Add the new RKP attestation root (ECDSA P‑384) and keep the legacy root until April 10, 2026; verify attestationSecurityLevel and CRLs. (developer.android.com)
• Use Apple Managed Device Attestation where device provenance matters (work‑managed fleets, regulated flows). It cryptographically binds the attested key to that specific Secure Enclave and device board IDs. (support.apple.com)
• If you need passkeys on Ethereum: prefer networks with RIP‑7212/EIP‑7951 enabled; for L1, combine session keys + ERC‑7715/7710, or delegate via EIP‑7702. (gov.optimism.io)
• Avoid legacy GG18/GG20; baseline on MPC‑CMP or CGGMP21/24 implementations with identifiable abort and documented side‑channel mitigations. Track vendor patches. (fireblocks.com)
• Plan for PQC posture gradually: Android signals ML‑DSA attestation keys in the future; keep your verification pipeline modular. (developer.android.com)
• Counterfactual signatures: use ERC‑6492 for pre‑deploy auth, but constrain “factoryCalldata” and simulate to mitigate known bypass classes. (eips.ethereum.org)

Mini‑implementation snippets

• WebAuthn create options to prefer hardware-backed P‑256

{
  "publicKey": {
    "rp": { "name": "Acme Wallet" },
    "user": { "id": "<32B-random>", "name": "user@example.com", "displayName": "User" },
    "challenge": "<32B-random>",
    "pubKeyCredParams": [{ "type": "public-key", "alg": -7 }], // ES256 (P-256)
    "authenticatorSelection": { "residentKey": "preferred", "userVerification": "required" },
    "attestation": "direct",
    "timeout": 60000
  }
}

• Server verification notes:

  • iOS/macOS: accept Apple MDA chain (Enterprise Attestation Root), validate freshness code and sepOS/board OIDs. (support.apple.com)
  • Android: parse KeyDescription, require attestationSecurityLevel=TrustedEnvironment/StrongBox, pin the new RKP root, and honor revocation lists. (developer.android.com)

• ERC‑7715 permission grant (conceptual)

await window.ethereum.request({
  method: "wallet_requestExecutionPermissions",
  params: [{
    chainId: "0x1",
    to: "0xSessionAccount",
    permission: { type: "erc20-token-allowance", isAdjustmentAllowed: false, data: {
      token: "0xA0b86991...", allowance: "0x2386F26FC10000" // 0.01 USDC
    }},
    rules: [{ type: "expiry", data: { timestamp: 1751328000 } }] // Jul 31, 2025
  }]
});

Redeem via ERC‑7710 DelegationManager; always simulate first. (eips.ethereum.org)

Why this unlocks ROI (with fresh metrics you can cite internally)

• Conversion and success rates: Microsoft reports passkey sign-ins are ~3× more successful (≈98% vs 32%) and ~8× faster than password+MFA. This cascades into higher “sign-in to first‑transaction” conversion. (microsoft.com)
• Adoption: nearly 1M passkeys registered daily across Microsoft consumer properties in 2025; the FIDO Alliance highlights similar lift among large deployers. (microsoft.com)
• Checkout and auth reliability: payment networks and banks report 2–3 pp success‑rate uplifts as passkeys replace OTP frictions—small percentage gains that matter at volume. (m.economictimes.com)
• Feature uptake: post‑Pectra, wallets executed >11,000 EIP‑7702 authorizations in week one—clear signal users will adopt smart‑account conveniences quickly when offered. (theblock.co)

How we engage (and what we deliver)

• Architecture, build, and integration:
  • Smart-account and permissions design (EIP‑7702, ERC‑4337, ERC‑7710/7715), on-chain verifiers (EIP‑7951/RIP‑7212), and MPC signer clusters. Delivered as a 6–10 week scoped build using our [custom blockchain development services] and [blockchain integration] practice. (blog.ethereum.org)
  • Security artifacts: attestation verification services, enclave policies, HSM key ceremonies, and an audit pack via our [security audit services].
  • Growth plumbing: dapp sessions, 7715 permission prompts, paymaster flows, and KPI instrumentation via our [web3 development services].
• Relevant links:
  • custom blockchain development services
  • blockchain integration
  • security audit services
  • web3 development services
  • smart contract development
  • cross‑chain solutions development
  • If you’re also exploring consumer DeFi UX, see our [defi development services] and [dapp development] accelerators.
    • defi development services
    • dapp development

What will this cost/time? A reference timeline we actually hit

• 0–2 weeks: device attestation verifiers (iOS MDA, Android Key Attestation, root updates), passkey flows in staging, and signed test vectors. (support.apple.com)
• 3–6 weeks: ERC‑7715 permissioning + ERC‑7710 redemption path; EIP‑7702 delegation or ERC‑4337 builder integration; on-chain P‑256 verification on L2 where supported. (eips.ethereum.org)
• 6–10 weeks: MPC signer cluster (Nitro Enclaves + HSM recovery), runbooks/SLOs, and production cutover with toggles. (docs.aws.amazon.com)

A brief note on ZK and privacy

• We routinely minimize PII in attestation evidence; where a relying party only needs “hardware‑backed, current OS,” we store a salted digest of attestation claims and prove authorization off‑chain, keeping verifiable logs. This design aligns with least‑privilege while preserving an investigative trail if fraud occurs.

Final thought — keyless is now an enterprise pattern, not an experiment

• The standards you need are live: passkeys are mainstream, Ethereum’s 7702 unlocks smart wallets without address churn, and P‑256 verification is widely present on L2s. The last mile is stitching together device attestation, MPC shares with real hardware roots, and on‑chain permission standards—exactly what we productize. (developer.chrome.com)

CTA (personalized and specific) If you’re the Product or IAM owner at a fintech/payment app with ≥5M MAU and you must ship a passkey‑first, EIP‑7702‑compatible wallet before Android’s April 10, 2026 RKP cutover, book a 45‑minute architecture review. In 7 days, we’ll deliver a build‑or‑buy plan, an attestation trust‑store diff (Apple MDA + Android RKP), and an L2 selection matrix for P‑256 verification—so you can lock scope and hit the date. Start here via our [blockchain integration] page. (developer.android.com)

Appendix — quick reference to the 2025–2026 changes you’ll care about

• Apple Managed Device Attestation docs (Jan 28, 2026 update). (support.apple.com)
• Android Key Attestation + RKP root rotation timeline and actions. (developer.android.com)
• EIP‑7702 (Pectra, mainnet May 7, 2025). (blog.ethereum.org)
• RIP‑7212/EIP‑7951 P‑256 verification (OP Stack “Fjord,” other L2s; proposed mainnet EIP‑7951). (gov.optimism.io)
• ERC‑7710/7715 delegation and permissions (drafts used by leading wallets). (eips.ethereum.org)
• FROST RFC 9591 (IRTF) for Schnorr threshold; ROAST for robustness. (datatracker.ietf.org)
• GG18/GG20 vulnerability note; prefer CGGMP21/24 or MPC‑CMP. (fireblocks.com)

7Block Labs can help you deploy this, end‑to‑end—without the “crypto‑bro” shortcuts.